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THE TAX COURT SMILES ON THE FOREIGN-EARNED
INCOME OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
TAXPAYERS: ROBERT R. BOTTOME
Sometimes the Sense is more confined and contracted than the
Letter, and sometimes it is more large and extensive.'
There is no surer guide in the interpretation of a statute than its
purpose when that is sufficiently disclosed; nor any surer mark of
over solicitude for the letter than to wince at carrying out that
purpose because the words used do not formally quite match with
it.2
It is the design of this comment to delve into the history, scope
and purpose of section 911 of the Internal Revenue Code3 and, in
particular, of subsection 911(c) (3). 4 This inquiry will be made in
conjunction with a critical analysis of the Tax Court's decision in
Robert R. Bottome,5 a decision which results in unequal treatment
of taxpayers domiciled in community property states and non-com-
munity property states.6
1. Eyston v. Studd, 2 Plowden 459, 465 (1573).
2. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Tremaine, 133 F.2d 827, 830 (2d Cir.
1943) (opinion by Judge Learned Hand).
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 911. The portions of § 911 relevant to this
inquiry provide, in substance, that a United States citizen who is a bona
fide resident of a foreign country for an entire taxable year and who has
earned income from sources other than the United States or an agency
thereof may exclude from his gross income an amount not to exceed $20,000
for the taxable year.
4. Id. § 911(c) (3). Section 911(c) (3) provides in pertinent part:
(3) TREATMENT OF COMMviUNITY INCOME.-.. . with respect to
amounts received for services performed by a husband or wife
which are community income under community property laws ap-
plicable to such income, the aggregate amount excludable.., from
the gross income of such husband and wife shall equal the amount
which would be excludable if such amounts did not constitute such
community income.
5. 58 T.C. 212 (1972), afl'd without opinion, 486 F.2d 1314 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
6. At the outset the current Congressional effort to repeal the earned-
income exclusion of § 911, as revealed in the May 20, 1974, press release
of the House Ways and Means Committee, should be noted:
The committee began its consideration of various provisions in
the tax laws dealing with the treatment of foreign income earned
by U.S. taxpayers .... The provisions tentatively agreed to by
the committee today are as follows:
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THE INEQUITY ENGENDERED BY Robert R. Bottoze
The problem attacked by the court in Bottome may be brought
into sharp focus through the utilization of a hypothetical factual
situation so as to eliminate all extraneous factors.7 Consider first
a United States citizen who has worked during the entire past tax-
able year for a foreign corporation s in Venezuela where he has re-
sided and has earned $50,000. The taxpayer is domiciled in a com-
munity property state.9 He is married to a nonresident alien.10
(1) Earned income exclusion-The exclusion from income under
present law of $20,000 (or, in some cases, $25,000) for income
earned abroad by U.S. citizens living or residing abroad is to be
repealed.
6 P-H 1974 FmE. TAXES 59,120.6.
However, it should be added that this consideration being given to § 911
by the Ways and Means Committee does not mark the first time this section
has come under attack. In fact, § 911 has been subjected to repeated attack,
but, save for the tax reform measures of 1962, has escaped relatively un-
scathed. Slowinski and Williams, The Formative Years of the Foreign
Source Earned Income Exclusion: Section 911, 51 TAXES 355 (1973). In that
work the authors recommend several reasons to support their argument that
the earned income exclusion should be increased rather than decreased.
It should also be realized that even if § 911 were to be repealed, the con-
troversy surrounding the Bottome decision would not immediately cease.
Claims for refunds may be filed up to three years after filing of the return
or up to two years after the date of payment of the tax, whichever is later.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6511(a). Thus, for some period of time after the
repeal of § 911, refund claims would undoubtedly be filed.
7. This hypothetical will closely parallel the facts in Bottome, eliminat-
ing several elements which do not affect the subject of the inquiry.
8. It is not mandatory that the taxpayer be employed by a foreign cor-
poration before he may claim the § 911 exclusion. Employment by a United
States business in the foreign country is sufficient. Only that income "paid
by the United States or any agency thereof" may not be excluded under
§ 911. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 911(a).
9. It has long been recognized that, at least for purposes of income tax-
ation, residence and domicile are not synonomous. Bowring v. Bowers, 24
F.2d 918 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 608 (1928); Rev. Rul. 56-269, 1956-1
Cum. BuLL. 318. Although residence connotes some degree of permanency,
it is something less than domicile, domicile being that place to which one
has a "fixed or definite intention to return and remain." Niki v. United
States, 28 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 71-5135 (N.D. Cal. 1971), affd, 484 F.2d 95(9th Cir. 1973).
Additionally, it should be recognized that the result would be the same
if the United States citizen were domiciled, not in a community property
state, but rather in a community property country if the rights of the
spouses were substantially the same as those of spouses in states where the
community property system has been held to divide the income between
spouses. Rev. Rul. 65-37, 1965-1 Cum. BuLL. 514.
10. The circumstances of the taxpayer being a United States citizen and
being domiciled in a state do not necessarily alter the wife's status as a
nonresident alien.
The domicile of a husband in a community property State fixes
the domicile of the wife in that State. However, the fact that the
wife is domiciled in a community property State does not deter-
mine whether she is a nonresident alien.
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At the conclusion of the taxable year the -taxpayer files his re-
turn. Since his wife is a nonresident alien, he cannot file a joint
return."- However, being domiciled in a community property juris-
diction, he is entitled to the benefits of income-splitting.12 He thus
files his separate return reporting one-half of the income or $25,000.
The remaining $25,000 is his wife's share of the community income,
but she is not required to pay tax on this portion.13
The final step is the exclusion from gross income allowed by sec-
tion 911. The Regulations are clear that in this factual situation
the taxpayer must halve the exemption and is thus entitled to ex-
clude only $10,000 from his $25,000 portion of the income. 14 How-
ever, Example (5) of the relevant section of the Regulations was
held invalid by the Tax Court in Bottome, 15 and the taxpayer was
allowed to take the entire statutory exclusion.
The inequity engendered by the decision of the Tax Court can
best be demonstrated by comparing the taxpayer of the hypotheti-
cal to one in the same position save for the fact that he is domiciled
in a non-community property state. This latter taxpayer expects
to pay tax on twice the amount of income as the former because
he is not entitled to the benefits of income-splitting and cannot file
a joint return with his nonresident alien wife. He excludes the
full amount allowed by section 911, that is $20,000, and finds himself
left with $30,000 income. The taxpayer from the community prop-
erty state has also been granted the entire section 911 exclusion,
though, and finds himself paying tax, not on $15,000, but on only
$5,000.
The unfair advantage enjoyed by the taxpayer from the com-
munity property jurisdiction as a result of Bottome becomes ob-
Rev. Rul. 56-269, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 318, 318. See also Rev. Rul. 72-546,
1972-2 Cum. BuLL. 435, superseding, I.T. 3859, 1947-2 Cum. BuLL. 98.
11. I T. REV. CODE or 1954, § 6013 (a).
12. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
13. In the case of a nonresident alien, gross income includes only that
income "derived from sources within the United States" and that income
"effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the
United States." INT. Rav. CODE or 1954, § 872(a). The hypothetical wife's
-hare of income is not "derived from sources within the United States", as
it was earned through the performance of personal services in Venezuela.
5ee Treas. Reg. § 1.862-1(a) (3) (1957).
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.911-2(d) (4) (ii) Example (5) (1963).
15. 58 T.C. at 217.
vious. The Tax Court in rendering its decision recognized this fac-
tor in observing: "True this gives a taxpayer in petitioner's position
an advantage not enjoyed by residents of non-community-property
States .... "16 However, the Court then added, "but we find
nothing in the law which denies that advantage."'17 It is submitted
that there is, in fact, much "in the law" which denies that advan-
tage.
OVERSOLICITUDE FOR THE LETTER AND LACK OF CONSIDERATION
OF THE PURPOSE
A reading of the Bottome decision brings to light the shortcom-
ings of the majority in that case. The "over solicitude for the
letter"' 8 is readily apparent. The court segregated what it con-
sidered key portions of section 911(c) (3)1 along with selected
excerpts from the committee reports"0 to arrive at its conclusion
that ". . . Example (5) of section 1.911-2(d)(4)(ii), Income Tax
Regs., which would cut in half the statutory exclusion.., is not
consonant with the statutory language and hence is invalid."2'
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Tremaine, 133 F.2d 827, 830 (2d Cir
1943).
19. 58 T.C. at 215 n.2. The key portion of the statute italicized by the
court reads:
[W]ith respect to amounts received for services performed ...
which are community income... the aggregate amount excludable
under subsection (a) from the gross income of such husband and
wife shall equal the amount which would be excludable if such
amounts did not constitute such community income.
20. 58 T.C. at 215-16. One item which the court deemed of significance
was a statement made in the reports of the committees of both Houses of
Congress and included in the Regulations: "[T]he amount excludable un-
der [section 911] from the gross income ... shall be neither increased nor
decreased by operation of community property law." Treas. Reg. § 1.911-
2(d) (4) (i) (1963); H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. A-86 (1962);
S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d sess. 233-34 (1962).
A second statement from the House Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee which the majority asserted compelled them to
find Example (5) invalid advised:
[Ojne $20,000 ... ceiling will apply with respect to the husband's
earnings abroad even though under community property law, half
of this income is the income of the wife.
H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, 55 (1962); S. REP. No. 1881, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 74, 76 (1962). However, when read in the context of case
law developments at that same time, it is readily apparent that the com-
mittees were saying one celing, as opposed to two ceilings, would apDly
even though half the income was that of the wife. See Jean Renoi, 37 T.C.
1180 (1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1963) (both husband and wife un-
successfully contended that each was entitled to exclude $20,000 of their
portion of the community income earned by the husband in France). Thus,
this portion of the committee reports furnishes no support for the holding
that the statutory exclusion is not to be cut in half,
21. 58 T.C. at 217-18.
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When considered divorced from case law developments at the
time section 911(c) (3) was enacted and divorced from consideration
of the purposes of Congress in enacting section 911 and subsection
911(c) (3), some of the language relied upon by the majority in
Bottome would seem to indicate that the statutory exclusion cannot
be halved in a factual situation such as the stated hypothetical.
However, recognition should be given to the truism that "the ex-
pounding of a statutory provision strictly according to the letter
without regard to other parts of the Act and legislative history
would often defeat the object intended to be accomplished." 22
The problem is, in essence, one of statutory interpretation, and
the alternatives are to interpret the words of the statute literally
or to inquire into the history and purposes of the statute and
thereby to effectuate the intent of Congress. An instructive lesson
on statutory interpretation was expounded by the Supreme Court
in Ozawa v. United States:23
It is the duty of this court to give effect to the intent of Congress.
Primarily this intent is ascertained by giving the words their
natural significance; but if this leads to an unreasonable result,
plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole
we must examine the matter further. We may then look to the
reason of the enactment, and inquire into its antecedent history,
and give it effect in accordance with its design and purpose, sac-
rificing, if necessary, the literal meaning in order that the purpose
may not fail.24
Design and Purpose of Section 911
Section 911 has led a tumultuous existence since the time of its
conception in 1926.25 However, the exclusion provision has with-
stood repeated attacks, and legislators have often cited the salutory
purposes which support the exclusion.26 An analysis of the pur-
poses which supported the original enactment of the forerunner to
section 911 and which have supported its repeated reenactment
22. Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 464 (1934).
23. 260 U.S. 178 (1922). See also United States v. American Trucking
Assn., 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
24. 260 U.S. at 194.
25. The legislative history of section 911 is set out in Slowinski & Wil-
liams, The Formative Years of the Foreign Source Earned Income Exclu-
sion: Section 911, 51 TAXEs 355 (1973).
26. See, e.g., Krichbaum v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. Tenn.
1956).
should prove elucidating in interpreting the statute as it would gov-
ern the hypothetical fact situation.
The remote ancestor of section 911 was enacted in 1926 for the
purposes of putting "Americans who work abroad in a position of
equality with their competitors by leaving them subject only to the
income tax levied on them by the country where they were em-
ployed" 27 and of encouraging American citizens to go abroad.28
That it was the clear intent of Congress that the provision not be
applied so as to enable persons to escape all income tax became
manifestly apparent when the exclusion was claimed by American
military and diplomatic personnel stationed in foreign countries,
who were not taxed by the country in which they were stationed.2
When that situation was brought to light in the 1932 hearings on the
predecessor to section 911, Senator Reed cogently observed: "These
people do not deserve the exemption because they are not subject
to the income taxation of the foreign countries in which they are
stationed .... ,,0 Senator Reed's subsequent proposal to amend
the section so as to exclude from its operation amounts paid by
the United States or an agency thereof was adopted. 1
Thus, it is apparent that a primary purpose of the foreign-earned
income exclusion was to preclude double taxation of Americans
abroad.32 Undoubtedly, if there is in fact no double taxation, the
purposes and goals of the section could best be carried out by dis-
allowing the exclusion.3 In the hypothetical fact situation, and
in Bottome, there is no taxation by the United States on one-half
of -he community income, the one-half allotted to the nonresident
alien wife.3 4 Thus, to give effect to the legislative purpose, the ex-
clusion should be disallowed to the extent of one-half of its allow-
able limit. To the extent that a proportionate part of the income
27. Commissioner v. Wolfe, 361 F.2d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 838 (1966).
28. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53 (1951).
29. Prior to 1932 the section contained no provision excluding from its
operation amounts paid by the United States or an agency thereof. REV.
AcT. oF 1926, § 213(b) (14), reenacted, REv. AcT OF 1928, § 116(a).
30. 75 CoxG. REC. 10,410 (1932) (remarks of Senator Reed).
31. REV. ACT OF 1932, § 116(a).
32. This rationale supporting the § 911 foreign-earned income exclusion
is now of limited viability given the effect of the foreign tax credit provision
of Internal Revenue Code § 901.
33. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wolfe, 361 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (tax-
payer employed in Iran and paid by U.S. Bureau of Public Roads from
funds supplied by Iranian government; while technically the income came
from Iran, the court held the taxpayer was not entitled to the § 911 exclu-
sion citing as one of the principal reasons for its decision that the taxpayer
was not required to pay tax to Iran on the income).
34. INT. REv. CODE or 1954, § 872 (a).
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would be taxed twice, that same proportionate part of the section
911 exclusion should be allowed.35
Design and Purpose of Subsection 911(c)(3)
Subsection (c) (3) was not added to section 911 until the enact-
ment of the tax reform measures of 1962. 3 6 Prior to that time there
was no provision of section 911 expressly dealing with community
income. The inquiry then must be made into the purposes for
which Congress added the community income provision. The re-
ports of the Ways and Means Committee37 and of the Finance Com-
mittee3 8 and the records of the floor debates 9 concerning the
Revenue Act of 1962 furnish surprisingly little insight into why the
Congress added subsection (c) (3) to section 911. It then becomes
necessary to inquire into the principles and circumstances which
prompted the Congress to add this provision to section 911 and
thereby to determine the intent of Congress in its application.
"A cardinal principle of Congress in its tax scheme is uniformity
.... ,,40 Primarily since 194841 this principle has consistently im-
35. Although the literal wording of the section provides for no such ap-
portioning of the exclusion, it would seem that effectuation of the purposes
of § 911 mandates such an interpretation. Thus, where the objective of the
statute is to prevent the double taxation of income but, at the same time,
to ensure that the income does not escape taxation totally, which, in effect,
it does when it is taxed by only one sovereign and allowed to be utilized
as an exclusion by another sovereign, the exclusion should only be allowed
ratably with the amount of income taxed twice. The regulations, in effect,
applied § 911 in this manner when they stated that a taxpayer, only one-
half of whose income was taxable by the United States, was entitled to only
one-half of the statutory exclusion. Treas. Reg. § 1.911-2(d) (4) (ii) Exam-
ple (5) (1963).
36. Rev. Act of Oct. 16, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 11(a), 76 Stat. 1003,
amending INT. Ray. CODE Or 1954, § 911 (codified in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 911(c) (3)).
37. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1962).
38. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong,, 2d Sess. 74 (1962).
39. 108 CONG. REc. 5303-46, 5376-435, 17529-30, 17544-51, 17556, 17586,
17737-39, 17740-99, 17811-13, 17836-71, 17882-90, 17890-91, 17892-914, 18063-
81, 18087-90, 18090-99, 18100-27, 18151-54, 18155-69, 18171-99, 18199-201,
18205-35, 18315-26, 18382-89, 18435, 18445-46, 18447-82, 18482-83, 18484-99,
18504-05, 18513-14, 18527-642, 18709-10, 18716-26, 18732, 18734-43 (1962).
40. United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361, 364 (1953).
41. The REVENUE ACT OF 1948 was enacted in that year providing for the
so-called "split-income" plan permitted a married couple to file a joint re-
turn and pay twice the tax that would be paid by a single taxpayer having
one-half of their joint income. This provision essentially gave to non-coin-
pelled Congress to attempt to achieve uniformity of treatment of
taxpayers in community property states and non-community prop-
erty states. It can thus be fairly assumed that Congress adopted
subsection 911 (c) (3) with this principle of uniformity in mind and
for the unstated purpose of ensuring equality of treatment between
taxpayers of community property jurisdictions and non-community
property jurisdictions.
It appears from a reading of the technical explanations of sub-
section 911(c) (3) in the committee reports that Congress, in its
desire to ensure uniformity, was concerned with two basic situa-
tions: one in which the amount of the exclusion might be increased
by the operation of community property laws, and the other in
which the amount of the exclusion might be decreased by the opera-
tion of community property laws.42 Regrettably, it is impossible
to divine precisely the fact situations which were contemplated by
the lawmakers. However, an analysis of case developments at about
the time of the enactment of section 911(c) (3) should furnish some
insight into what was weighing on the minds of the legislators when
they decided to add the community income provision.
At about the time of the consideration of the amendatory pro-
vision to section 911, the case of Jean Renoir 43 was being considered
by the Tax Court. In that case the taxpayer claimed that he and
his wife were each entitled to the $20,000 section 911 exclusion from
their respective portions of the community income earned by him,
thus giving the community a total $40,000 section 911 exclusion.
However, the court rejected the taxpayer's claim and allowed only
one $20,000 exclusion. It is extremely plausible that the Renoir-
type claim was that contemplated by Congress when it explained
that the section 911 exclusion was not to be increased by the opera-
tion of community property laws. 44
Similarly, there was a question prior to the addition of subsection
(c) (3) of whether the wife's share of community income retained
its exempt character when she had not resided in the foreign coun-
try with her husband. 45  Although there was authority40 for the
munity property taxpayers the same advantages previously enjoyed only
by community property taxpayers.
42. "Paragraph (3) of section 911 (c) provides in effect that . . . the
amount excludable under section 911 (a) is to be neither increased nor de-
creased solely by operation of community property law." H.R. REP. No.
1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. A-86 (1962); S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
233-34 (1962).
43. 37 T.C. 1180 (1962), afid, 321 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1963).
44. In Fink v. United States, 454 F.2d 1387, 1392 n.4 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 844 (1972), the court recognized that the result reached in Renoir
is now mandated by § 911 (c) (3).
45. Of course, this question would never arise as long as the foreign-em-
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proposition that exempt community income earned by the husband
retained that character in the hands of the wife, two decisions 1
in the 1950's and a subsequent Revenue Ruling 48 dealing with sec-
tion 251 of the 1939 Code49 somewhat muddied the waters in this
respect. The result of those authorities was that a spouse was en-
titled to the section 931 (formerly section 251) exclusion only if
she individually met the requirements of that section. It would
then seem that in order to preclude any possibility of a court's hold-
ing that because a wife did not satisfy the statutory residence re-
quirements of section 911, her portion of the community income
could not benefit from the exclusion, the Congress explained that
subsection (c) (3) would function so that the section 911 exclusion
would not be decreased by the operation of the community property
laws.
Thus, in these two factual circumstances, which were undoubt-
edly in the contemplation of the legislators, subsection 911(c) (3)
precludes, in one case, an increase of the statutory exclusion which
would give community property taxpayers an unfair advantage
over those domiciled in non-community property states and, in the
second case, a decrease in the statutory exclusion which would give
non-community property taxpayers an unfair advantage over com-
munity property taxpayers. Applying the interpretation of the
committee with respect to subsection 911(c) (3) in the circumstances
discussedal yields the uniformity of treatment which Congress in-
tended. However, literally applying the interpretation from the
committee reports in the Bottome-type situation, as the court did,
yields an inequitable result which gives a community property tax-
payer an unfair advantage.
The holding in Bottome then reflects a failure of the court to
give adequate consideration to the Congressional principle of uni-
ployed community property husband earned more than twice the statutory
exclusion. In those cases, even after the income was split with the wife re-
siding in the United States, the husband still recognized enough income to
allow him to utilize the entire statutory exclusion.
46. E.R. Kaufman, 9 B.T.A. 1180 (1928), acq., VII-2 Cum. BuLL. 21 (1928).
47. Francis C. Mullen, 14 T.C. 1179 (1950) and Markham v. United States,
45 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1143 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
48. Rev. Rul. 54-16, 1954-1 Cum. BuLL. 157.
49. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 289, § 251, 52 Stat. 532 (now INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 931).
50. Supra note 41.
51. See text accompanying notes 42-48 supra.
formity of tax treatment. Courts in general are noticeably aware
of this principle and seek to apply taxation statutes so as to deny
any unfair advantage to taxpayers domiciled in community prop-
erty jurisdictions:
[I]n general, a common thread runs through these decisions [deal-
ing with community income], namely, an effort by the courts to
interpret the various statutory provisions in such manner as to
produce uniformity of treatment of spouses throughout the coun-
try, whether they reside in community property States or else-
where.52
Cases abound wherein taxation statutes have been interpreted so
as not to give to domiciliaries of community property states pref-
erential treatment over domiciliaries of non-community property
states and vice-versa.5 3
In holding as it did, the Tax Court has attributed to Congress
an intent to grant an advantage to community property taxpayers.
However, it has been held: "A desire for equality among taxpayers
is to be attributed to Congress, rather than the reverse,"64 and,
moreover, "[I] n the 'absence of a 'clear-cut statutory mandate' an
intention should not be attributed to Congress to grant preferential
treatment to taxpayers who live in community property states."' 5
Considering the legislative history and purposes of subsection
911 (c) (3), it is impossible to discover any "clear-cut statutory man-
date" of discrimination between taxpayers in that provision.
52. Daniel M. Ebberts, 51 T.C. 49, 53 (1968).
53. See, e.g., Epley v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1950), rev'g,
13 T.C. 77 (1949) (holding a spouse's one-half of her military husband's
income to be "earned income" so as to entitle that portion of the income
to the benefits of the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, the court stressing
that the statute was not "drawn to ... discriminate between soldiers from
community and from non-community states"); Pierce v. United States, 254
F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1958) (interpreting a spouse's one-half of her husband's
business income to be business income so as to require that current busi-
ness losses be applied against it rather than allowing them to be carried
back to previous years; the holding achieved uniformity of treatment of tax-
payers in community property and non-community property states); Ross
v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 445 (1961) (holding that taxpayers in community
property jurisdictions were not entitled to an additional deduction of $2,000
in capital losses over capital gains, but were limited to $1,000 just as tax-
payers in non-community property jurisidictions); Fink v. United States,
454 F.2d 1387 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (denying the section 911 exclusion to the spouse
of a taxpayer who was domiciled in Washington and working in Japan for
the United States, noting:
Plaintiff's position in the instant case calls for an interpretation
of Section 911 that discriminates in favor of spouses from commu-
nity property states. Since there is no "clear-cut statutory man-
date" for such preferential treatment, another important ground
exists for holding against plaintiffs.)
54. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 422, 425 (1943).
55. Renoir v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1963), aff'g, 37
T.C. 1180 (1962) (emphasis added).
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INVALIDATION OF A REGULATION
One of the more disturbing aspects of the Tax Court's decision
in Bottome is that in its holding it was required to invalidate a
portion of the Treasury Regulations which was determinative of
the issue there presented. Example (5) of section 1.911-2 (d) (4) (ii)
of the Regulations5" expressly provides that in a situation such as
the Bottome case and the introductory hypothetical, the taxpayer
is allowed only one-half of the statutory exclusion: "The division
of income ... also divides the exemption provided under ... this
section." Upon reaching a result in Bottome which was contrary
to this Example, the court held: "[W] e think Example (5) of sec-
tion 1.911-2 (d) (4) (ii), Income Tax Regs. . . . is not consonant with
the statutory language and hence is invalid."57
That Treasury Regulations are to be accorded great weight by
the courts has been frequently reiterated. Recently the Supreme
Court has cautioned:
[I]t is fundamental... that as 'contemporaneous constructions by
those charged with administration of' the Code, the Regulations
'must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent
with the revenue statutes' and 'should not be overruled except for
weighty reasons.' 58
The Supreme Court has thus set out a two-pronged standard to
be considered in overruling Regulations-the Regulation must be
both (1) "unreasonable" and (2) "plainly inconsistent with the
revenue statutes."
The rationale for the courts' insistence that Treasury Regulations
are not to be lightly invalidated has been variously stated. Princi-
pal reliance is derived from section 7805(a) of the Code5 9 which
provides, in pertinent part, that "the Secretary or his delegate shall
prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of
this title ... ." Since they are promulgated under such statutory
authority, the Regulations are then said to "have the force and ef-
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.911-2 (d) (4) (ii) (Example (5) (1963).
57. 58 T.C. at 217-18.
58. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-50 (1969) (emphasis added). See
also Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931); Boske
v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 470 (1900); Commissioner v. South Texas Lum-
ber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 336 (1930);
Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
59. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7805 (a).
fect of law."60 Having such force they are not to be lightly dis-
carded by the courts.
There has also been a noticeable deference to the Regulations on
the basis of their being promulgated by the office charged with
the responsibility of effectively administering the tax laws of the
nation. The United States Supreme Court, in this regard, has noted
that interpretations by administrative bodies are entitled to great
weight where the interpretation involves "contemporaneous con-
struction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility
of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work ef-
ficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new."0' 1 This
respect for the tax-administering bodies has even impelled the Su-
preme Court to remark that courts should refrain, insofar as pos-
sible, from mandating changes in the administration of the tax
laws:
[W]e do not sit as a committee of revision to perfect the adminis-
tration of the tax laws. Congress has delegated to the Commis-
sioner, not to the courts, the task of prescribing "all needful rules
and regulations for the enforcement" of the Internal Revenue Code.
26 U.S.C. § 7805(a). In this area of limitless factual variations,
"it is the province of Congress and the Commissioner, not the
courts, to make the appropriate adjustments."62
Thus, it can be seen that, for a variety of reasons, Treasury Regula-
tions are to be accorded great weight. Because of the respect which
is to be accorded to them, respect approaching that to be accorded
to statutes, they are not to be invalidated except for "weighty
reasons" and upon a showing of unreasonableness and inconsist-
ency. 63
That the Regulation held invalid in Bottome is not unreasonable
but rather is unquestionably an intelligent, equitable and reason-
able construction of section 911(c) (3) is pointed out in the dissent-
ing opinion of Judge Raum 4 Example (5), by its operation, denies
to taxpayers from community property states the unfair advantage
of the full statutory exclusion when they are taxed on only one-
half of the earned income. In so doing, it prevents the inequitable
situation which results from the Bottome decision. To argue that
60. Industrial Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 870, 875 (D.S.C.
1972), affd, 481 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1143 (1974).
61. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315
'(1933).
62. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1967) (emphasis
added).
63. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 750 (1969).
64. 58 T.C. at 218. It should be noted that three judges of the Tax Court
concurred in Judge Raum's dissent.
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the Regulation is "unreasonable" would require a mind impervious
to the realities of the situation.
The second prong of the Supreme Court's test would require a
determination that the Regulation is "plainly inconsistent with the
revenue statutes." The Tax Court placed emphatic reliance on its
finding that the Regulation invalidated was at variance with the
statutory language.65 However, it at no time considered the Regu-
lation in connection with the statutory purposes of section 911 and
of subsection 911(c) (3). Undoubtedly, had the court recognized the
underlying purpose of section 911 to prevent the double taxation
of income and of subsection 911(c) (3) to treat community property
and non-community property taxpayers in parity, it would have
concluded that while the Regulation might not conform to the
exact words of the statute, it most assuredly is plainly consistent
with the purposes of the section. It is then readily apparent that
the majority of the Bottome court failed to render to Treasury
Regulation section 1.911-2 (d) (4) (ii) Example (5) that degree of re-
spect mandated by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States.6 6
STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF EXEMPTION PROVISION
During the past half century various rules have developed gov-
erning the interpretation of tax statutes. Perhaps the most well-
known (and most often asserted) of these rules is that tax laws
are in general to be construed most strongly against the govern-
ment and in favor of the taxpayer. 67 However, contrary to the
general rule, grants of exemptions are to be given strict interpreta-
tion against the taxpayer. 68
It has been stated that the "basis for applying the rule of strict
construction to statutory provisions granting tax exemptions . . .
is to minimize differential treatment and foster impartiality, fair-
65. Id. at 217-18.
66. It should be realized, though, that even if the court were to interpret
the phrase "plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes" to mean "plainly
inconsistent with the letter of the revenue statutes", it still could not hold
the Regulation invalid. The Supreme Court test, being a mandatory two-
part test, requires a determination of both inconsistency and unreasonable-
ness.
67. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917).
68. Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 48-49 (1949).
ness, and equality of treatment among taxpayers."6 9 Section 911,
being an exemption section, should then be construed against the
taxpayer claiming the exclusion so as to minimize any differential
treatment among taxpayers. The decision in Bottome reflects a lib-
eral construction of section 911 in favor of the taxpayer. The tax-
payer, although he was required to recognize only one-half of his
earned income, was given the benefit of the entire statutory ex-
emption. By so holding, the court admittedly gave to "a taxpayer
in [Bottome's] position an advantage not enjoyed by residents of
non-community-property States. . . ,",70 the precise inequity which
the rule of statutory construction of exemptions against the tax-
payer was designed to preclude.
The argument can be made that a taxpayer in Bottome's position
is entitled to the exclusion, as, regardless of how the statute is con-
strued, there is nothing in the letter of the law to deny the ex-
clusion to him. However, the mere fact that a taxpayer's claim
of exemption falls within the letter of the law is insufficient to
entitle him to that exemption.
Taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception; and
the claimant of such an exemption must show his right thereto
by evidence which leaves the question free from doubt. The claim-
ant is within the letter as well as the spirit of the law.7
As discussed previously,72 the spirit and legislative purposes of sec-
tion 911 and of subsection 911(c) (3) are in no way furthered by
the allowance of the full exclusion to a taxpayer who recognizes
only one-half of his income. The taxpayer's claim then cannot be
said to fall within the "spirit" of the law, and it should have been
disallowed.
Thus, had the Tax Court adhered to accepted principles of stat-
utory construction, the court would have denied the benefit of the
full section 911 exclusion to the taxpayer in Bottome and would
have reached the Congressionally compelled result of fair, impartial
and equal treatment of taxpayers from community property states
and those from non-community property states. Its failure to ad-
here to those accepted principles has resulted in an anomolous hold-
69. 3 C. SANDS= STATUTES -AND -STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, A REVISION or
THE TmiD EDmIoN or SumERLAND STATUTORY CoNsTRucTrON § 66.09, at 207
(4th ed. 1974).
70. 58 T.C. at 217.
71. Jones v. Iowa State Tax Commission, 247 Iowa 530, 74 N.W.2d 563,
565 (1956) (emphasis added). Accord, Trustees of Iowa College v. Baillie,
236 Iowa 235, 17 N.W.2d ,143 (1945); Craig v. Bates, 44 Misc. 2d 432, 254
N.Y.S.2d 244 (1954); Clarke v. Union Trust Co. of Dist. of Md., 192 Md.
127, 63 A.2d 635 (1949);
72. See text accompanying note 30 supra..
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ing, in essence, that Congress had mandated inequitable treatment
of taxpayers. 73
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Tax Court in Robert R. Bottome has resulted
in a situation of a taxpayer domiciled in a community property state
having an inequitable advantage over one similarly situated but
from a non-community property state. The court based its decision
on a determination that there was nothing in the letter of the stat-
ute to deny to the taxpayer the benefits of the full exclusion. How-
ever, assuming arguendo that on its face the statute does not deny
the benefit of the full exclusion, the inquiry should not have ceased
at that point.
Consideration of the legislative purposes supporting the enact-
ment of section 911 and of subsection 911(c) (3) would have man-
dated a denial of the full exclusion to the taxpayer in Bottome and,
thus, equitable treatment of taxpayers domiciled in community
property and non-community property jurisdictions. Additionally,
had the court given to the portion of the Regulations7 4 which it
invalidated the weight and respect to be accorded to such promulga-
tions and evaluated that Regulation in terms of its reasonableness
and consistency with the statute, the Regulation would undoubtedly
have been upheld as a proper interpretation of Congressional intent.
Finally, commonly accepted rules of statutory construction, if ap-
plied by the court, would have required a strict interpretation of
section 911 against the taxpayer and would have yielded an equi-
table result.
It is hoped that future courts faced with a claim for the section
911 exclusion in the context of a situation such as that of Robert
R. Bottome will not yield to the taxpayer on the basis of the Bot-
73. Cf. Bingler v Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 751-52 (1969) (taxpayer unsuc-
cessfully contended that all amounts received by him while on leave to
write his dissertation were excludable from gross income as "scholarships"
under § 117 of the Internal Revenue Code; court noted that exemptions are
to. be construed--narrowly-and, in view-of -the-fact-that -under----1-17 even-
modest, sums received by teaching assistants-were not exempted, declined
"to assume that Congress intended to sanction-indeed... to compel-such-
an inequitable situation").
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.911-2(d) (4) (ii) Example (5) (1963).
tome decision75 The arguments not treated by the majority in that
case should be fully aired without that "over solicitude for the
letter" which unfortunately prevailed in the Tax Court.
ROBERT G. RUSSELL, JR.
75. On March 15, 1974, suit was filed in the District Court for the South-
ern District of California after a claim for refund by a taxpayer in the same
circumstance of Robert Bottome was disallowed. Russell T. Emery, Civil
No. 74-226-T (S.D. Cal., filed Mar. 15, 1974).
